Iranian Conventional Forces The Iranian Army Iranian Tank Strength Other Iranian Armor Iranian Anti-Tank Weapons Iranian Artillery Strength Iranian Surface-to-Surface Missiles Iran’s Scud B Missiles Iran’s Scud C Missiles Iran’s Shahab Missiles Iranian Army Air Defense Systems Iranian Army Aviation Command, Control, Communications... Other Aspects of Iranian Army Capability The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps The Quds (Qods) Forces The Basij and Other Paramilitary Forces The Iranian Navy The Iranian Air Force Iranian Air Strength Iranian Land-based Air Defense Iranian Air Force Readiness and Effectiveness Capabilities to Carry Out Attacks in the Gulf Iranian Proliferation and WMD The Status Chemical Weapons Program The Status Biological Weapons Program The Status Iranian Nuclear Program The Uncertain Character of Nuclear Facilities Nuclear Developments in 2003 and 2004 Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Development Options Dates regarding Nuclear Weapons Nuclear Warfighting Doctrine and Capabilities Iran’s Past Search For Nuclear Weapons Iranian Statements Regarding Nuclear Weapons Nuclear Weapons Efforts Under the Shah The Revitalization of Nuclear Weapons Effort Creeping Proliferation Under Rafsanjani Chinese Reactor Deals Russian Reactor Deals Longer-term Reactor Programs Reactors and Proliferation Proliferation and the Nuclear NPT Iranian Nuclear Weapons Facilities Scare Reports and Deliberate Misinformation The NPT, IAEA Inspections, and Deniability Iran’s Current Efforts Delivery Systems Chemical Weapons Biological Weapons Nuclear Weapons Missile Defenses

The Iranian Navy The Iranian Navy has some 18,000 men. According to the IISS, this total includes a two brigade marine force of some 2,600 men and a 2,000-man naval aviation force. It has bases at Bandar-e Abbas, Bushehr, Kharg Island, Bander-e Anzelli, Chah Bahar, Bander-e Mahshahar, and Bander-e Khomeini. This gives it bases opposing most of the Saudi coast. It has 3 submarines, 3 frigates, 2 corvettes, 10 missile patrol craft, 7 mine warfare ships, 44 coastal and inshore patrol craft, and 9-10 amphibious ships. Its naval aviation branch is one of the few air elements in any Gulf Navy, and has 5 maritime patrol aircraft, and 19 armed helicopters. When combined with the IRGC naval branch, this is a total maritime strength of 38,000 men with significant capabilities for both regular naval and asymmetric naval warfare. Iran has given the modernization of its naval forces high priority. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has obtained new anti-ship missiles and missile patrol craft from China, midget submarines from North Korea, submarines from Russia, and modern mines. Iran has expanded the capabilities of the naval branch of the IRGC, acquired additional mine warfare capability, and upgraded some of its older surface ships. Iran’s exercises have included a growing number of joint and combined arms exercises with the land forces and air force. Iran has also improved its ports and strengthened its air defenses, while obtaining some logistic and technical support from nations like India and Pakistan. In August 2000, the Islamic Republic announced that it had launched its first Cordesman: Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities 12/8/04 19 domestically-produced light submarine, which is called the Al-Sabiha 15. It can be used for reconnaissance and laying mines.xxvii Iran’s ability to compensate for the weaknesses of its surface missiles depends heavily on its ability to use anti-ship missiles to make up for its lack of airpower. Iran’s Western-supplied missiles are now all beyond their shelf life and their operational status is uncertain. Iranian forces are now operating four systems that Iran has obtained from China: • The Seersucker is a long-range, mobile anti-ship missile, which is designated the HY-2 or Sea Eagle-2 by the People's Republic of China. It is a large missile with a 0.76 meter diameter and a weight of 3,000 kilograms. It has an 80-90 kilometer range and a 450 kilogram warhead. There are two variants. One uses radar active homing at ranges from the target of eight kilometers (4.5 nautical miles). The other is set to use passive IR homing and a radar altimeter to keep it at a constant height over the water. • The CS-801 anti-ship missile, also called the Yinji (Hawk) missile, is a solid fueled missile. It can be launched from land and ships. It has a range of approximately 74 kilometers in the surface-to-surface mode, and uses J-Band active radar guidance. It has a 512 kilogram warhead and cruises at an altitude of 20-30 meters. • The CS-802 is an upgraded CS-801. It uses a turbojet propulsion system with a rocket booster instead of the solid fueled booster in the CS-801. It has a range of 70-75 miles, has a warhead of up to 363 pounds, and can be targeted by a radar deployed on a smaller ship or aircraft operating over the radar horizon of the launching vessel.xxviii • The CS-801K is a Chinese-supplied, air-launched anti-ship missile and variant of the CS-801. It too is a sea-skimming, high-subsonic cruise missile and has a range in excess of 20 nautical miles. It has been test fired by Iran’s F-4Es, but Iran may be able to use other launch aircraft. This air delivery capability gives Iran what some analysts have called a “360 degree” attack capability, since aircraft can rapidly maneuver to far less predictable launch points than Iranian combat ships.xxix Iran has sought to buy advanced anti-ship missiles from Russia, North Korea and China, to buy anti-ship missile production facilities, and possibly even Chinese-made missile armed frigates. Some sources have claimed that Iran has bought eight Sovietmade SS-N-22 "Sunburn" or "Sunburst" anti-ship missile launch units from Ukraine, and has deployed them near the Straits of Hormuz. However, US experts have seen no evidence of such a purchase and doubt that Iran has any operational holdings of such systems. The “SS-N-22” is a title that actually applies to two different modern long-range supersonic sea skimming systems -- the P-270 Moskit (also called the Kh-15 or 3M80) and P80 or P-100 Zubi/Onika. Iran’s main launch platforms for anti-ship missiles include three British-supplied Vosper Mark 5 Sa’am-class frigates -- called the Alvand, Alborz, and Sabalan -- each is a 1,100-ton frigate with a crew of 125-146 and maximum speeds of 39 knots. Each was Cordesman: Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities 12/8/04 20 originally armed with one five-missile Sea Killer Mark II surface-to-surface missile launcher and one Mark 8 4.5" gun mount. They have since had their Sea Killer’s replaced with C-802 anti-ship missiles and new fire control radars. The Sea Killer has a relatively effective beam-riding missile with radio command or optical guidance, and a maximum range of 25 kilometers. All are active, but the Sabalan took serious damage from the US Navy during the tanker war of 1987-1988. The ASW capabilities of these ships seem to be limited. Iran has two US PF-103 (Bayandor-class) corvettes called the Bayandor and the Naghdi. These ships are 900-ton vessels, with crews of 140, two 76 mm guns and a maximum speed of 18 knots. They were laid down in 1962 and delivered in 1964. The Bayandor and the Naghdi are probably the most active large surface ships in the Iranian navy. However, neither is equipped with anti-ship and anti-air missiles, sophisticated weapons systems, sonars, or advanced electronic warfare equipment and sensors. The rest of Iran's major surface vessels consist of missile patrol boats. These include 10 68-ton Chinese Hudong (Hudong)-class fast attack craft or missile patrol boats. The Hudong (Hudong)-class fast attack craft are equipped with I-band search and navigation radars, but do not have a major anti-air missile system. Iran ordered these ships for the naval branch of its Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps in 1992, and all 10 were delivered to Iran by March 1996. The vessels have a crew of 28. They carry four anti-ship missiles, and are armed with the CS-801 and CS-802 missile. Iran now has at least 100 CS-801s and CS-802s. Iran’s missile patrol boats also include 10 275-ton French-made Combattante II (Kaman-class) fast attack boats, out of an original total of twelve. These boats are armed with anti-ship missiles, one 76 mm gun, and have maximum speeds of 37.5 knots. They were originally armed with four US Harpoon missiles, but their Harpoons may no longer be operational. At least five had been successfully converted with launchers that can carry two to four CS-801/CS-802s. Iran has a number of large patrol craft and fast attack craft. The operational ships of this type include: three North Korean-supplied 82-ton Zafar-class (Chaho-class) fast attack craft with I-band search radars and armed with 23 mm guns and a BM-21 multiple rocket launcher; two Kavian-class (US Cape-class) 148-ton patrol craft armed with 40 mm and 23 mm guns; and three Improved PGM-71 Parvin-class 98-ton patrol craft supplied in the late 1960s, and armed with 40 mm and 20 mm guns. There are some 35 other small patrol boats plus large numbers of small boats operated by the IRGC. Most of these craft are operational and can be effective in patrol missions. They lack, however, sophisticated weapons systems or air defenses, other than machine guns and SA-7s and SA-14s. Iran has 5-6 BH-7 and 7-8 SRN-6 Hovercraft, believed to be operated by the IRGC. About half of these Hovercraft may be operational. They are capable of speeds of up to 60-70 knots. They are lightly armed and vulnerable, but their high speed makes them useful for many reconnaissance and unconventional warfare missions, and they can rapidly land troops on suitable beaches. Mine warfare, amphibious warfare, anti-ship missiles, and unconventional warfare offer Iran other ways of compensating for the weakness of its conventional air and naval forces. Iran's mine warfare vessels include 2-3 Shahrock-class MSC-292/268 coastal minesweepers (1 used for training in the Caspian Sea). Two of these three ships, the Shahrock and Karkas, are known to be operational. They are 378-ton sweepers that can be used to lay mines as well as sweep, but their radars and sonars date back to the late Cordesman: Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities 12/8/04 21 1950s and are obsolete in sweeping and countermeasure activity against modern mines. Iran has 1-2 Cape-class (Riazzi-class) 239-ton inshore minesweepers, and seems to have converted two of its Iran Ajar-class LSTs for mine warfare purposes. Many of its small boats and craft can also lay mines. Both the Iranian Navy and the naval branch of the IRGC are expanding their capability for mine warfare. While Iran has only a limited number of specialized mine vessels, it can also use small craft, LSTs, Boghammers, helicopters, and submarines to lay mines. As a result, it is impossible to determine how many ships Iran would employ to plant or lay mines in a given contingency, and some of its mines might be air dropped or laid by commercial vessels, including dhows. Iran has a range of Soviet, Western, and Iranian-made moored and drifting contact mines, and US experts estimate that Iran has at least 2,000 mines. Iran has significant stocks of anti-ship mines, and has bought Chinese-made and North Korean-made versions of the Soviet mines. It has claimed to be making its own non-magnetic, acoustic, free-floating and remote controlled mines, and has had Chinese assistance in developing the production facilities for such mines. It may have acquired significant stocks of nonmagnetic mines, influence mines, and mines with sophisticated timing devices from other countries. xxx There also are reports that Iran has negotiated with China to buy the EM-52 or MN- 52 rocket-propelled mine. The EM-52 is a mine that rests on the bottom until it senses a ship passing over it, and then uses a rocket to hit the target. The maximum depth of the Straits of Hormuz is 80 meters (264 feet), although currents are strong enough to displace all but firmly moored mines.xxxi Combined with modern submarine laid mines and antiship missile systems like the CS-801/802, and SS-N-22, the EM-52 would give Iran considerable capability to harass Gulf shipping and even the potential capability to close the Gulf until US naval and air power could clear the mines and destroy the missile launchers and submarines. Even obsolete moored mines have proven difficult to detect and sweep when intelligence does not detect the original laying and size of the minefield, and free floating mines can be used to present a constant hazard to shipping. Bottom-influence mines can use acoustic, magnetic, or pressure sensors to detect ships passing overhead. They can use multiple types of sensor/actuators to make it hard to deceive the mines and force them to release, can be set to release only after a given number of ships pass, and some can be set to attack only ships of a given size or noise profile. Such mines are extremely difficult to detect and sweep, particularly when they are spaced at wide intervals in shipping lanes. Iran has significant amphibious assets by Gulf standards, and the regular Navy and naval branch of the IRGC have independent marine forces. These assets are large enough to move a battalion-sized force relatively rapidly, and include: Four Hengam-class (Larak-class) LST amphibious support ships (displacement of 2,940-tons loaded) that can carry up to six tanks, 600 tons of cargo, and 227 troops; and three Iran Hormuz-class (South Korean) LSTs (2,014-tons loaded) that can carry up 9 tanks and berth 140 troops. They also include 3 Hormuz-21 class 1,80-ton LSTs and 3 Fouque class 176-ton LSLs. Iran’s amphibious ships give it the theoretical capability to deploy about 1,000 troops, and theoretically about 30-40 tanks in an amphibious assault – but Iran has never Cordesman: Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities 12/8/04 22 demonstrated that it has an effective over-the-shore capability. Iran might use commercial ferries and roll on-roll off ships if it felt they could survive. Iran has also built up its capability to hide or shelter small ships in facilities on its islands and coastline along the Gulf, and the ability to provide them with defensive cover from anti-air and anti-ship missiles. However, all of Iran’s training to date has focused on amphibious raiding and not on operations using heavy weapons or larger operations. Iran lacks the air and surface power to move its amphibious forces across the Gulf in the face of significant air/sea defenses, or to support a landing in a defended area. Iran has support ships, but these are generally insufficient to sustain "blue water" operations and support an amphibious task force. It has one Kharg-class 33,014 ton replenishment ship, two Bandar Abbas-class 4,673 ton fleet supply ships and oilers, one 14,410 ton repair ship, two 12,000 ton water tankers, seven 1,300 ton Delva-class support ships, 5-6 Hendijan-class support vessels, two floating dry-docks and 20 tugs, tenders, and utility craft to help support a large naval or amphibious operation. The Iranian Navy's air capability consists of two to three operational P-3F Orion maritime patrol aircraft out of an original inventory of five. According to reports from the Gulf, none of the surviving P-3Fs have fully operational radars and their crews often use binoculars. It also has up to 12 Sikorsky SH-3D ASW helicopters, two RH-53D mine laying helicopters, and seven Agusta-Bell AB-212 helicopters. It uses air force AH-1J attack helicopters, equipped with French AS.12 missiles, in naval missions, and has adapted Hercules C-130 and Fokker Friendship aircraft for mine laying and patrol missions. The most significant recent development in Iran’s capabilities to use airpower to attack naval targets has been the acquisition of the CS-801K for its regular air force. Iran has attempted to offset the weakness of its major surface forces by obtaining three Type 877 EKM Kilo-class submarines. The Kilo is a relatively modern and quiet submarine that first became operational in 1980. The Iranian Kilos are Type 877EKM export versions that are about 10 meters longer than the original Kilos and are equipped with advanced command and control systems. Each Type 877EKM has a teardrop hull coated with anechoic tiles to reduce noise. It displaces approximately 3,076 tons when submerged and 2,325 tons when surfaced. It is 72.6 meters long, 9.9 meters in beam, has a draught of 6.6 meters, and is powered by three 1,895 HP generator sets, one 5,900 SHP electric motor and one six-bladed propeller. It has a complement of 52 men and an endurance of 45 days. Its maximum submerged speed is 17 knots and its maximum surface speed is 10 knots. Each Kilo has six 530 mm torpedo tubes, including two wired guided torpedo tubes. Only one torpedo can be wire-guided at a time. The Kilo can carry a mix of 18 homing and wire guided torpedoes or 24 mines. Russian torpedoes are available with ranges of 15-19 kilometers, speeds of 29-40 knots, and warheads with 100, 205, and 305-kilogram weights. Their guidance systems include active sonar homing, passive homing, wire guidance, and active homing. Some reports indicate that Iran bought over 1,000 modern Soviet mines with the Kilos, and that the mines were equipped with modern magnetic, acoustic, and pressure sensors. The Kilo has a remote anti-aircraft launcher with one preloaded missile in the sail and Soviet versions have 6 SA-N-5 (Igla/SA-16) surface-to-air missiles stored inside. However, Russia only supplied Iran with the SA-14 (Strela). The Kilo has a maximum surface speed of 10 knots, a maximum submerged speed of about 17 Cordesman: Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities 12/8/04 23 knots, a minimum submerged operating depth of about 30 meters, an operational diving depth of 240 meters, and a maximum diving depth of 300 meters. The submarine also has a surface cruise range of 3,000-6,000 nautical miles and a submerged cruise range of 400 nautical miles -- depending on speed and combat conditions.xxxii Iran’s ability to use its submarines to deliver mines and fire long-range wakehoming torpedoes give it a potential capability to strike in ways that make it difficult to detect or attack the submarine. Mines can be laid covertly in critical areas before a conflict, and the mines can be set to activate and de-activate at pre-determined intervals in ways that make mining difficult to detect and sweep. Long-range homing torpedoes can be used against tanker-sized targets at ranges in excess of 10 kilometers, and to attack slow-moving combat ships that are not on alert and/or which lack sonars and countermeasures. At the same time, many Third World countries have found submarines to be difficult to operate. For example, Russia delivered the first two Kilos with two 120- cell batteries designed for rapid power surges, rather than power over long periods. They proved to last only 1-2 years in warm waters versus 5-7 years for similar batteries from India and the UK. Iran had to turn to India for help in developing batteries that are reliable in the warm waters of the Gulf. Iran has also had problems with the air conditioning in the ships, and their serviceability has been erratic. There are serious questions about crew capability and readiness, and all three submarines already need significant refits. Iran faces significant operational problems in using its submarines in local waters. Many areas of the Gulf do not favor submarine operations. The Gulf is about 241,000 square kilometers in area, and stretches 990 kilometers from the Shatt al-Arab to the Straits of Hormuz. It is about 340 kilometers wide at is maximum width, and about 225 kilometers wide for most of its length. While heat patterns disturb surface sonars, they also disturb submarine sonars, and the advantage seems to be slightly in favor of sophisticated surface ships and maritime patrol aircraft. The deeper parts of the Gulf are noisy enough to make ASW operations difficult, but large parts of the Gulf -- including much of the Southern Gulf on a line from Al Jubail across the tip of Qatar to about half way up the UAE -- are less than 20 meters deep. The water is deeper on the Iranian side, but the maximum depth of the Gulf -- located about 30 kilometers south of Qeys Island -- is still only 88 meters. This means that no point in the Gulf is deeper than the length of an SN-688 nuclear submarine. The keel to tower height of such a submarine alone is 16 meters. Even smaller coastal submarines have maneuver and bottom suction problems, and cannot hide in thermoclines, or take advantage of diving for concealment or selfprotection. The Strait of Hormuz at the entrance to the Gulf is about 180 kilometers long, but has a minimum width of 39 kilometers, and only the two deep water channels are suitable for major surface ship or submarine operations. Further, a limited flow of fresh water and high evaporation makes the Gulf extremely salty. This creates complex underwater currents in the main channels at the Straits of Hormuz and complicates both submarine operations, and submarine detection. There are some areas with considerable noise, but not of a type that masks submarine noise from sophisticated ASW detection systems of the kind operated by the US and UK. Further, the minimum operating depth of the Kilo is 45 meters, and the limited depth of the area around the Straits can make submarine Cordesman: Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities 12/8/04 24 operations difficult. Submarines are easier to operate in the Gulf of Oman, which is noisy enough to make ASW operations difficult, but such deployments would expose the Kilos to operations by US and British nuclear attack submarines. It is unlikely that Iran’s Kilos could survive for any length of time if hunted by a US or British navy air-surface-SSN hunter-killer team.xxxiii In any case, the effectiveness of Iran’s submarines is likely to depend heavily on the degree of Western involvement in any ASW operation. If the Kilos did not face the US or British ASW forces, the Iranian Kilos could operate in or near the Gulf with considerable impunity. If they did face US and British forces, they might be able to attack a few tankers or conduct some mining efforts, but are unlikely to survive extended combat. This makes the Kilos a weapon that may be more effective in threatening Gulf shipping, or as a remote minelayer, than in naval combat. Certainly, Iran’s purchase of the Kilos has already received close attention from the Southern Gulf states and convinced them that they must take Iran more seriously. Finally, any analysis of the capabilities of the Iranian Navy cannot ignore the fact that Iran’s unconventional warfare capabilities include the naval branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps which operates Iran's land-based anti-ship missiles and coastal defense artillery. In addition to its land and sea-based anti-ship missile forces, the naval guards can use large numbers of small patrol boats equipped with heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, anti-tank guided weapons, manportable surface-to-air missies, and 106 mm recoilless rifles. The IRGC also uses small launches and at least 30 Zodiak rubber dinghies to practice rocket, small arms, and recoilless rifle attacks. Its other small craft were armed with a mix of machine guns, recoilless rifles, and man and crew-portable anti-tank guided missiles. These vessels are difficult to detect by radar in anything but the calmest seas. Iran bases them at a number of offshore islands and oil platforms, and they can strike quickly and with limited warning. The Naval Branch of the IRGC also has naval artillery, divers, and mine-laying units. It had extensive stocks of Scuba equipment, and an underwater combat center at Bandar Abbas.xxxiv Iran is also improving the defenses and port capabilities of its islands in the Gulf, adding covered moorings, more advanced sensors, and better air defenses. Iran can use IRGC forces to conduct the kind of low-intensity/guerrilla warfare that can only be defeated by direct engagement with land forces, and filter substantial reinforcements into a coastal area on foot or with light vehicles, making such reinforcement difficult to attack. Iran can use virtually any surviving small craft to lay mines and to place unmoored mines in shipping lanes. Its IRGC forces can use small craft to attack offshore facilities and raid coastal targets. Finally, it is important to note the US did not successfully destroy a single land-based Iraqi anti-ship missile launcher during the Gulf War, and the IRGC now has many dispersal launch sites and storage areas over a much longer coast. It also has a growing number of caves, shelters, and small hardened facilities. Such targets are sometimes difficult to detect until they are used, and present added problems because they usually are too small and too numerous to attack with high cost ordnance until it is clear they have valuable enough contents to merit such an attack. Cordesman: Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities 12/8/04 25 The main forces of the Iranian navy are concentrated in the Gulf. Iran gives more importance to the security of its territorial sea in the Gulf area since in this direction it has highly complicated relations with various Arab nations, the United States, and Israel. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Iran’s policy towards the Caspian has changed. According to the contracts between the Soviet Union and Iran, Tehran was not allowed to station its navy in the Caspian Sea. After the disintegration of the USSR, however, the 4th naval regional forces started representing the Iranian navy in the Caspian. xxxv The Islamic Republic has almost 3,000 personnel in the Caspian. The forces include up to 50 fighting ships and support vessels, the Marine Corps, coastal guard forces, and the sea aircraft. There are also training vessels in the fleet, including one Shahrokh MSC minesweeper, 2 Hamzeh ships and others. Currently, Iran has the second largest fleet in the Caspian after Russia. The fleet, however, is outdated. This is why Tehran has been trying to strengthen its naval forces in the Caspian through various programs. It is reported that the government has numerous plans to modernize its fleet. According to these projects, the future fleet will include several divisions and separate battalions of ships and submarines. xxxvi In summary, Iran’s efforts have steadily improved Iran's capabilities to threaten Gulf shipping and offshore oil facilities, its capability to support unconventional warfare, and its ability to defend Iran’s off-shore facilities, islands, and coastline. They have not, however, done much to help Iran to act as an effective “blue water” navy. Iranian naval forces still have many limitations, but the military capability of Iranian naval forces should not be measured in terms of the ability to win a battle for sea control against US and British naval forces, or any combination of Southern Gulf states supported by US and British forces. For the foreseeable future, Iran's forces are likely to lose any such battle in a matter of days. As a result, it is Iran's ability to conduct limited or unconventional warfare, or to threaten traffic through the Gulf, that gives Iran the potential ability to threaten or intimidate its neighbors.